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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-SHIPPING AGENT-AUTHORITY TO MAKE VALUATION
AGREEMENT WITH CARRER.-This is an action by a shipper against

a common carrier to recover the value of goods lost in transportation.
Prior to the shipment in question, the parties entered into an oral
agreement whereby the carrier undertook to transport at fixed rates
such goods as the shipper should from time to time deliver to it.
Nothing was said with respect to limiting the carrier's liability nor
was any choice of rates offered to the shipper. The plaintiff's shipping agent accepted a receipt from the carrier containing a provision
which limited the liability of the carrier to $50 unless greater value
was declared and an extra charge paid. No value was declared nor
was an extra charge paid. The agent had often accepted such receipts
but the shipper was unaware of the practice. The trial court limited
the plaintiff's recovery to the amount stated in the receipt on the
ground that the agent had authority to bind his principal by entering
into the valuation agreement. Held, reversed. The shipper is entitled
to recover the full value of the goods since his agent had no authority
to modify the terms of the contract made previously between himself
and the carrier. Northern Assur. Co., Limited, of London v. B. A.
W. Trucking Co., Inc., 252 App. Div. 323, 299 N. Y. Supp. 308 (1st
Dept. 1937).
Ordinarily, a shipping agent has implied authority to make reasonable terms concerning the shipment.1 Such authority extends to
the making of contracts limiting the liability of the carrier.2 Thus,
where the vendee of an expensive mirror directed the vendor to ship
it, and in shipping the mirror the vendor accepted a receipt limiting
liability in case of breakage, it was held that the vendee was bound by
the agreement made by the vendor with the carrier.8 Where a drover
accompanied a shipment of hogs it was held that while on the way he
could agree with the carrier for limited liability. 4 Nor does it seem
to be material that the agent was not aware that by accepting the
receipt he was entering into a valuation agreement. 5 In these cases
there was no prior contract between the principal and the carrier.
'Jennings v. G. T. R. R., 127 N. Y. 438, 28 N. E. 394 (1891).
- Shelton v. Merchants' Dispatch Trans. Co., 59 N. Y. 258 (1874); Root v.
New York & New England R. R., 76 Hun 23, 27 N. Y. Supp. 611 (1894);
Jones v. New York, L. E. & W. R. R., 3 App. Div. 341, 38 N. Y. Supp. 284
(2d Dept. 1896); Smith v. Southern Express Co., 104 Ala. 387, 16 So. 62
(1894); Adams Express Co. v. Byers, 177 Ind. 33, 95 N. E. 513 (1911);
Stubblefield v. St. Louis & S. F. R. R., 194 Mo. App. 396, 184 S. W. 149 (1916).
' Nelson v. The H. R. R., 48 N. Y. 498 (1872).
'Squire v. New York Central R. R., 98 Mass. 239 (1867); cf. Gulf, C. &
S. F. R. R. v. White (Tex. Civ. App. 1895) 32 S. W. 322 (employefe sent
along with a shipment of cattle cannot be assumed to have authority to make
contract limiting liability of a connecting carrier).
Lansing v. New York Central & H. R. R. R., 52 Misc. 334, 102 N. Y.
Supp. 1092 (1907).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 12

Under such circumstances it is clear that the agent can enter into a
valuation agreement binding on his principal. 6
In those cases in which the shipper has already made some
arrangements with the carrier, nothing being said about limiting liability, the question arises whether under all the circumstances a binding contract has been created, or whether it was the intent of the
parties that the shipper's agent should have the power to stipulate for
the terms of shipment. If the principal has entered into a binding
agreement, the agent cannot modify it. 7
The problem is illustrated by several cases the facts of which are
strikingly similar to each other. In these cases a hotel guest notifies
the carrier to take his trunk. Before checking out of the hotel the
guest notifies some person there to see to it that the carrier receives
the trunk. The carrier then gives a receipt to the person tendering
the trunk, which receipt limits liability unless greater value be declared
and paid for. Does the valuation agreement bind the guest? Several
New York cases hold that it does ; 8 a New Jersey case holds that it
does not. 9 Apparently, these cases treat as a question of law the
problem whether or not a prior contract has been made between the
guest and carrier, holding the latter to his strict common law liability.
Whether or not an agreement has been reached between the shipper
'Addoms v. Weir, 56 Misc. 487, 108 N. Y. Supp. 146 (1907) (hotel guest
directed bell boy to bring package to carrier and ship it) ; see notes 3, 4, mpra.
'Dudley v. Perkins, 235 N. Y. 448, 139 N. E. 570 (1923) (agent with duty
of supervising performance of contract has no authority to modify its terms) ;
McPherson v. Cox, 86 N. Y. 472 (1881) (captain of vessel has no authority to

alter terms of charter party agreed on by shipper and owner of vessel). In
Hooper v. Taylor, 4 E. D. Smith 486 (N. Y. 1855), principal agreed to perform
work for another, nothing being said about compensation; his agent was told
that the work done must not exceed $200. Principal recovered the reasonable
value of his work which was greater than $200; Northern Assur. Co., Ltd., of
London v. B. A. W. Trucking Co., Inc., 252 App. Div. 323, 299 N. Y. Supp.
308 (1st Dept. 1937); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R v. Watson, 71 Kan. 696,
81 Pac. 499 (1905), where father made oral contract with carrier 'for shipment
of cattle; son went along to look after cattle. Father recovered full value of
cattle destroyed, notwithstanding his son accepted a receipt limiting liability.
'Barter v. Barrett, 186 App. Div. 715, 174 N. Y. Supp. 779 (1st Dept.
1919) (maid accepted receipt) ; Knapp v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 134 App. Div.
712, 119 N. Y. Supp. 134 (3d Dept. 1909) (hotel clerk accepted receipt) ; Miller
v. Taylor, 100 Misc. 18, 164 N. Y. Supp. 823 (1917) (under the circumstances
the hotel clerk was constituted the agent to ship, and'therefore had the power
to stipulate for limited liability).
' Stickel v. United States Express Co., 85 N. J. L. 285, 89 Atl. 23 (1913)
(the natural inference is that the company assumed its common law liability).
Compare Donovan v. Standard Oil Co., 155 N. Y. 112, 49 N. E. 678 (1898)
(carrier offered to carry goods; shipper wrote back, "We accept your offer."
The court held that this constituted preliminary arrangements and that the full
contract was made when the shipper's agent accepted a receipt limiting liability),
with Jennings v. G. T. R. R., 127 N. Y. 438, 28 N. E. 394 (1891), where the
shipper by mail agreed to send his potatoes at fixed rates and'his agent accepted
a receipt limiting liability, the court held that the shipper was warranted in
assuming that the prior agreement controlled.

1938]

RECENT DECISIONS

and carrier should be treated as a question of fact to be determined
by the evidence. 10
In the instant case the question of fact was settled in favor of the
plaintiff. He had made a prior oral agreement with the defendant,
but no choice of rates was offered to him. To find for the defendant
would be to nullify the rule requiring the carrier to afford the shipper
a choice of rates in order to limit his common law liability. To find
for the plaintiff is to reaffirm the well established rule that an agent
has no authority to modify a contract made by his principal."
T.G.

CHARITABLE

-SUFFICIEN

SUBSCRIPTIONs-AsSIGNABILITY-CONSIDERATION

CY OF COMPLAINT.-The following subscription was

signed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff's assignor: "To
aid and assist the Beth Israel Hospital Association in its humanitarian work, and in consideration of others contributing to the same
purposes the undersigned does hereby promise to pay to the order of
the Beth Israel Hospital Building * * * the sum of $5000 * * *. The

undersigned further requests each and every other contributor to make
his contribution in reliance upon the contribution of the undersigned
herewith made." The plaintiff alleges that the hospital "upon said
subscription * * * proceeded with its humanitarian work, obtained
other like subscriptions, expended large sums of money and incurred
large liabilities. * * *"

Defendant contends (1)

that the complaint

is insufficient as the subscription does not allege specific acts of consideration and being merely a general donation should not be enforced
by the courts of this state; 1 (2) that such agreements are not assignable. On appeal, held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. There is
an implied request that the hospital continue with its humanitarian
work. Such request constitutes an offer of a unilateral contract,
which, when accepted by the charity by incurring liability in reliance
" In Waldron v. Fargo, 170 N. Y. 130, 62 N. E. 1077 (1902), the plaintiff
sued to recover the value of horses destroyed in transportation. The defendant
carrier set up a valuation agreement, claiming to have made it with the plaintiff's shipping agent. Notwithstanding that the plaintiff gave evidence of a
prior oral agreement by which the defendant assumed his common law liability,
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. The Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that it was for the jury to find whether or not the
prior agreement claimed by the plaintiff had been made.
'See note 7, supra.
'Trustees of Hamilton College v. Stewart, 1 N. Y. 581 (1848) (a donation
"the interest of which shall be applied to the payment of the officers" of
Hamilton College was held unenforcible on the ground of lack of consideration) ; Hammond v. Shepard, 29 How. Pr. 188 (N. Y. 1865) (an agreement to
apply the money for college purposes was not considered sufficient consideration
for a promise to pay the trustees of the college a specified sum).

